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THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH SYSTEM AND 
THE THREAT OF PUBLIC HEALTH EMER-
GENCIES
Despite improvements during the past decade, the Philippines continues to face challenges in responding to public health emergencies 
because of poorly distributed resources and capacity. 
The Philippines has 10 hospital beds and six 
physicians per 10 000 people.1,2 and only about 
2335 critical care beds nationwide.3 The available 
resources are concentrated in urban areas, and rural 
areas have only one physician for populations up to 
20 000 people and only one bed for a population of 
1000.4 Disease surveillance capacity is also unevenly 
distributed among regions and provinces. The primary 
care system comprises health centres and community 
health workers, but these are generally ill-equipped 
and poorly resourced, with limited surge capacity, as 
evidenced by lack of laboratory testing capacity, limited 
equipment and medical supplies, and lack of personal 
protective equipment for health workers in both primary 
care units and hospitals.5 Local government disaster 
preparedness plans are designed for natural disasters 
and not for epidemics.
Inadequate, poorly distributed resources and ca-
pacity nationally and subnationally have made it difficult 
to respond adequately to public health emergencies in 
the past, as in the case of typhoon Haiyan in 2013.6 
The typhoon affected 13.3 million people, overwhelm-
ing the Government’s capacity to mobilize human and 
financial resources rapidly to affected areas.7 Failure 
to deliver basic needs and health services resulted in 
disease outbreaks, including a community outbreak of 
gastroenteritis.8 Access to care has improved in recent 
years due to an increase in the number of private hos-
pital beds;5 however, improvements in private sector 
facilities mainly benefit people who can afford them, in 
both urban and rural areas.
In this paper, we describe the challenges and early 
response of the Philippine Government, focusing on 
travel restrictions, community interventions, risk com-
munication and testing, from 30 January 2020 when 
the first case was reported, to 21 March 2020.
EARLY RESPONSE TO COVID-19
Travel restrictions
Travel restrictions in the Philippines were imposed 
as early as 28 January, before the first confirmed 
case was reported on 30 January (Fig. 1a).9  After the 
first few COVID-19 cases and deaths, the Government 
conducted contact tracing and imposed additional 
travel restrictions,10 with arrivals from restricted coun-
tries subject to 14-day quarantine and testing. While 
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only briefly, as the number of confirmed cases increased 
in the weeks that followed.11 Fig. 1b shows all interven-
tions, including travel restrictions undertaken before 6 
March, when the Government declared the occurrence 
of community spread, and after 11 March, when WHO 
declared COVID-19 a pandemic.
travel restrictions in the early phase of the COVID-19 
response prevented spread of the disease by potentially 
infected people, travellers from countries not on the 
list of restricted countries were not subject to the same 
screening and quarantine protocols. The restrictions 
were successful in delaying the spread of the disease 
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Fig. 1b. Timeline of key events and developments in the Philippines, 30 January–21 March 2020
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that health systems were not overwhelmed.14 While the 
lockdown implemented by the Government applied only 
to the island of Luzon, local governments in other parts 
of the country followed this example and also locked 
down. The ECQ gave the country the opportunity to 
mobilize resources and organize its pandemic response, 
which was especially important in a country with poorly 
distributed, scarce resources and capacity.
Risk communication
The Government strengthened and implemented na-
tional risk communication plans to provide information 
on the new disease. The Government conducted daily 
press briefings, sponsored health-related television and 
Internet advertisements and circulated infographics on 
social media. Misinformation and conspiracy theories 
about COVID-19 were nevertheless a challenge for a 
population that spends more than 10 hours a day on the 
Internet.15,16 These spread quickly and became increas-
ingly difficult to correct. Furthermore, the Government’s 
messages did not reach all households, despite access 
Community interventions
The Government declared “enhanced community quar-
antine” (ECQ) for Metro Manila between 15 March and 
14 April (Fig. 2a), which was subsequently extended 
to the whole island of Luzon (Fig. 2b). The quarantine 
consisted of: strict home quarantine in all households, 
physical distancing, suspension of classes and introduc-
tion of work from home, closure of public transport 
and non-essential business establishments, prohibition 
of mass gatherings and non-essential public events, 
regulation of the provision of food and essential health 
services, curfews and bans on sale of liquor and a 
heightened presence of uniformed personnel to enforce 
the quarantine procedures.12 ECQ – an unprecedented 
move in the country’s history – was modelled on the 
lockdown in Hubei, China, which was reported to have 
slowed disease transmission.13 Region-wide disease 
control interventions, such as quarantining of the entire 
Luzon island, were challenging to implement because 
of their scale and social and economic impacts, but 
they were deemed necessary to “flatten the curve” so 
Fig. 2. Provinces placed under enhanced community quarantine (ECQ). (2a) The Government declared ECQ in 
Metro Manila effective 15 March 2020; (2b) The Government declared ECQ on the entire island of Luzon 
effective 17 March 2020.
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ness, surveillance and testing capacity in particular is 
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to health services and information, resulting in limited 
knowledge of preventive practices, except for hand-
washing.17
Testing
Testing is key to controlling the pandemic but was done 
on a small scale in the Philippines. As of 19 March, 
fewer than 1200 individuals had been tested,11 as only 
the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine located in 
Metro Manila performed tests and assisted subnational 
reference laboratories in testing.18 No positivity rates 
for RT-PCR tests were reported until early April 2020. 
Because of the limited capacity for testing at the start 
of the pandemic, the Department of Health imposed 
strict protocols in order to ration testing resources while 
ramping up testing capacity. Most tests were conducted 
for individuals in urban areas, where the incidence was 
highest.19
CONCLUSIONS
At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the country’s 
initial response lacked organizational preparedness 
to counter the public health threat. The Philippines’ 
disease surveillance system could conduct contact 
tracing, but this was overwhelmed in the early phases 
of outbreak response. Similarly, in February, only one 
laboratory could conduct reverse transcriptase polymer-
ase chain reaction (RT–PCR) testing, so the country 
could not rapidly deploy extensive laboratory testing 
for infected cases. In addition, the primary care system 
of the Philippines did not serve as a primary line of 
defence, as people went straight to hospitals in urban 
areas, overwhelming critical care capacity in the early 
stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In response to the early phase of the pandemic, 
the Government of the Philippines implemented travel 
restrictions, community quarantine, risk communication 
and testing; however, the slow ramping up of capacities 
particularly on testing contributed to unbridled disease 
transmission. By 15 October, the number of confirmed 
cases had exponentially grown to 340,000 of which 
13.8% were deemed active.11 The lack of pandemic 
preparedness had left the country poorly defended 
against the new virus and its devastating effects. Invest-
ing diligently and consistently in pandemic prepared-
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